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MENS REA AND METHAMPHETAMINE:  
HIGH TIME FOR A MODERN DOCTRINE 
ACKNOWLEDGING THE NEUROSCIENCE 
OF ADDICTION 
Meredith Cusick* 
 
In American criminal law, actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea, “an act 
does not make one guilty, without a guilty mind.”  Both actus reus and 
mens rea are required to justify criminal liability.  The Model Penal Code’s 
(MPC) section on culpability has been especially influential on mens rea 
analysis.  An issue of increasing importance in this realm arises when an 
offensive act is committed while the actor is under the influence of drugs.  
Several legal doctrines address the effect of intoxication on mental state, 
including the MPC, limiting or eliminating its relevance to the mens rea 
analysis.  Yet these doctrines do not differentiate between intoxication and 
addiction. 
Neuroscience research reveals that drug addiction results in catastrophic 
damage to the brain resulting in cognitive and behavioral deficits.  
Methamphetamine addiction is of particular interest to criminal law 
because it causes extensive neural destruction and is associated with 
impulsive behavior, violent crime, and psychosis.  Furthermore, research 
has revealed important distinctions between the effects of acute intoxication 
and addiction.  These findings have implications for the broader doctrine of 
mens rea and, specifically, the intoxication doctrines.  This Note argues for 
the adoption of an addiction doctrine that acknowledges the effect of 
addiction on mens rea that is distinct from doctrines of intoxication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On a cold February day in Northern California, new mother Samantha 
Green swam across a fifty-five-degree muddy slough while holding her 
nineteen-day-old son, who was only wearing a thin onesie.1  After crossing 
the water with her newborn, Green passed out under a tree.2  When she 
awoke along the marsh the next day, she screamed until she was found.3  
 
 1. See Lindsey Bever & Amy B. Wang, Mother Whose Baby Died During a Meth-
Fueled Search for Her Lover Is Found Guilty of Murder, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/08/22/it-froze-last-night-
mother-accused-in-newborns-death-during-meth-fueled-search-for-lover/?utm_term=.9b15 
e4094ff6 [https://perma.cc/Z6MH-84EZ]. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
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Her infant son had died of exposure to the cold.4  When police arrived, their 
dashboard cameras captured Green shivering and howling at the death of 
her son.5  She moaned in grief on the recording, crying out, “I just want my 
baby,” “he doesn’t deserve this,” and “I love my baby.  Why?”6 
At trial, defense attorneys argued that, while Green was responsible for 
her infant son’s death, she was not a murderer.7  Green, a 
methamphetamine addict who had binged that tragic morning, crossed the 
slough in search of the father of her child (her fiancé and drug provider) 
correctly believing him to be with another woman.8  Defense experts 
testified that Green was in the grips of a methamphetamine-induced 
psychosis, experiencing apocalyptic thoughts and hallucinations.9  
Bypassing the lesser charge of involuntary manslaughter, the jury found 
Green guilty of second-degree murder10 by concluding that Green satisfied 
the offense’s mental state requirements:  “that 1) she intentionally 
committed an act that she knew was dangerous to human life, and 2) had a 
conscious disregard of that risk.”11  The jury was instructed that voluntary 
intoxication was no defense to murder.12  Green was sentenced to fifteen 
years to life in prison for her role in the death of her nineteen-day-old son 
named Justice.13 
In American criminal law, “‘actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea’ 
(meaning ‘an act does not make one guilty, without a guilty mind’).”14  
Both an act, actus reus, and a guilty mind, mens rea, are required for 
criminal liability.15  The necessity of examining each defendant’s mindset 
has contributed to the increasing overlap between neuroscience and 
criminal law.16  Between 2006 and 2012, the number of “law and 
 
 4. See id. 
 5. See Darrell Smith, Samantha Green Guilty of Murder in Death of Infant 
Son, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/crime/ 
article102222787.html [https://perma.cc/2WNX-U9Q2]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See Darrell Smith, Expert Says Drug-Induced Psychosis Led Samantha Green into 
Slough with Infant Son, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.sacbee.com/ 
news/local/crime/article100532587.html [https://perma.cc/XU7F-LM5A]. 
 10. See Smith, supra note 5. 
 11. Jade Wolkansky, Jury Finds Green Guilty of Second Degree Murder, DAVIS 
VANGUARD (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.davisvanguard.org/2016/09/jury-finds-green-
guilty-of-second-degree-murder/ [https://perma.cc/CN3U-QKWZ]. 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Lauren Keene, Samantha Green Sentenced to Prison; Bid for New Trial Denied, 
DAVIS ENTERPRISE (Dec. 11, 2016), http://www.davisenterprise.com/local-news/crime-fire-
courts/samantha-green-sentenced-to-prison-bid-for-new-trial-denied/ [https://perma.cc/E7B 
N-YMBW]. 
 14. Elizabeth Bennett, Neuroscience and Criminal Law:  Have We Been Getting It 
Wrong for Centuries and Where Do We Go from Here?, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 437–38 
(2016) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979)). 
 15. See id. 
 16. Neuroscience involves the study of the physiology, biochemistry, anatomy, or 
molecular biology of the brain and nervous system and their relationship to cognition and 
behavior. See Neuroscience, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
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neuroscience” publications multiplied by nearly tenfold, and interest in the 
intersection between these two fields continues to grow.17  Of interest is the 
potential for neuroscience to inform the understanding of moral 
responsibility and criminal liability.18 
This Note contributes to that body of scholarship by examining criminal 
law’s approach to the relationship between drug use and mental state.  It 
examines neuroscience research on the effect of addiction on the brain, with 
a focus on methamphetamine addiction, and considers whether these 
findings suggest addiction requires a different legal doctrine than that of 
intoxication. 
The history of the intoxication doctrine reflects tensions between 
criminal law, blameworthiness, and morality.19  What is not clear is 
whether addiction should fit within the various intoxication doctrines—and, 
if so, where—and how criminal law should adjust the mens rea analysis to 
acknowledge neuroscience findings that drug addiction results in 
catastrophic damage to the brain.20  This Note addresses this question with 
a focus on the mens rea and intoxication provisions of the Modern Penal 
Code (MPC). 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of mens rea and the intoxication 
doctrine, including an analysis of the three prominent doctrines of 
intoxication in American criminal law.  Next, Part II analyzes 
methamphetamine abuse and the neurological and behavioral changes 
associated with methamphetamine addiction.  Then, Part III explores 
difficulties in applying doctrines of intoxication to methamphetamine-
addicted individuals.  Finally, Part IV makes the case for a separate doctrine 
of addiction within the MPC and highlights addiction’s relevance to the 
mens rea analysis. 
I.  MENS REA, THE MODEL PENAL CODE, AND THE COURTS 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATION 
The foundation of American criminal law relies on the positive 
association between criminal liability and a guilty mind.21  But when an 
actor has committed a crime while under the influence of a mind-altering 
substance, there is debate as to whether intoxication should affect the mens 
rea analysis and, therefore, the imposition of criminal liability. 
This part examines the MPC’s approach to the mens rea analysis and the 
legal doctrines of intoxication.  Part I.A focuses on the MPC’s goals of 
 
webster.com/dictionary/neuroscience (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/LAT8-
HTD9]. 
 17. See Owen D. Jones et al., Neuroscientists in Court, 14 NATURE REVIEWS 
NEUROSCIENCE 730, 731 (2013) (showing a sharp rise in “neurolaw” field publications in 
figure 1). 
 18. See Bennett, supra note 14, at 437. 
 19. See infra Part I.B. 
 20. This Note does not take a position on the general admissibility of neuroscience 
evidence in court for culpability analyses. 
 21. See infra Part I.A. 
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simplicity and standardization in adopting the four mental states of purpose, 
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.  Part I.B discusses the emergence 
of criminal law’s intoxication doctrines, which are often invoked to negate 
mens rea. 
A.  Mens Rea in the Model Penal Code 
The MPC, completed in 1962 by the American Law Institute (ALI), 
sought to bring clarity to criminal common law.22  Its promulgation 
“prompted a wave of state code reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, each 
influenced by the Model Penal Code,” and the MPC is perhaps “the closest 
thing to being an American criminal code.”23  In addition to its influence on 
state code reform, the MPC is frequently cited by courts as persuasive 
authority.24  The MPC’s commentaries, published in the 1980s, illuminate 
the reasoning behind code provisions and frequently discuss the adoption or 
rejection of individual provisions by the states.25  The MPC’s mens rea 
section, section 2.02, is perhaps its greatest contribution to American 
criminal law reform.26 
The drafters of the MPC faced a daunting task in grappling with and 
codifying the near eighty mens rea terms in use among the states.27  The 
MPC predominantly sought to simplify and standardize the mens rea 
analysis in two ways:  (1) by reducing the use of normative terms and (2) by 
decreasing the number of mental states.28 
Abandoning terminology that required normative judgments—such as 
malice aforethought, premeditation, willfulness, carelessness, and 
wantonness—the drafters sought standardization in adopting “presumably 
testable phenomena such as ‘conscious object’ or ‘knowledge.’”29  The 
commonly held belief that consciousness and voluntariness would involve a 
more scientific analysis highlights the substantial influence exerted by the 
contemporaneous science of Freudian psychoanalysis.30  The MPC treats 
the conscious, voluntary act as a threshold requirement before a defendant’s 
mens rea can be determined.31  The mens rea analysis that proceeded was 
 
 22. See MARKUS D. DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL PENAL CODE 2 (2d ed. 
2015); see also id. at 44 (describing section 2.02 as “the heart of the Model Penal Code”). 
 23. Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code:  A Brief 
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 320 (2007). 
 24. See id. at 327. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See DUBBER, supra note 22, at 44. 
 27. See Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 
HASTINGS L.J. 815, 815 (1980). 
 28. See Robinson & Dubber, supra note 23, at 335. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 601.  Freudian psychoanalysis, which dominated psychiatry in the 1950s and 
1960s, is rooted in a fundamental distinction between conscious and subconscious thought. 
See id. at 616, 619–20. 
 31. See id. at 621.  Interestingly, the MPC does not define the term “voluntary” but 
instead provides examples of acts that are considered not voluntary. Id. at 620.  Moreover, 
while the MPC also fails to define “unconsciousness,” “the MPC’s Commentaries do make 
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then meant to “represent[] a subjective inquiry into a defendant’s mental 
attitude, not an objective inquiry based upon a reasonable person 
standard.”32  The emphasis on subjectivity also reflects the Freudian 
approach to individualized therapy.33  The drafters incorporated the science 
of their times while developing the MPC.34  While the fields of 
neuroscience and psychology have changed drastically since Freud’s time, 
the MPC’s mens rea analysis has not.  Still of critical importance to 
criminal law is the MPC’s most radical change to the law of mens rea, 
which was the adoption of only four culpability terms:  purpose, 
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.35 
The selection of only four mens rea terms may have been necessary to 
accommodate the MPC’s novel requirement that each element of an offense 
carry its own mental state.36  Instead of a typical offense analysis, in which 
only one state of mind is required by an offense, the MPC adopted criminal 
offense definitions that contain multiple elements, each of which might 
require a different culpable mental state.37  The elements to be examined 
under the MPC are conduct, attendant circumstance, and result.38 
By establishing only four culpability terms, the MPC eliminated some of 
the flexibility and nuance associated with the traditional mens rea analysis.  
Throughout history, “the process of recognizing additional distinctions [in 
culpable states of mind] has been through the recognition of additional 
bases for mitigation.  The new distinction creates a new category that will 
receive less harsh punishment, or limits a more harsh punishment to the old 
category.”39  The restriction of culpable mental states has resulted in the 
formation of doctrines seeking to negate mens rea, such as intoxication, 
which play a significant role in American criminal law. 
B.  The Law on Drugs 
The MPC and common law differ in their approach to the culpability of 
an intoxicated criminal defendant.  This section highlights the three 
 
many direct references to . . . psychoanalytic literature to explain why particular conditions 
were deemed unconscious and involuntary.” Id. at 621. 
 32. Id. at 646. 
 33. See id. at 619, 646. 
 34. See id. at 614. 
 35. See Robinson & Dubber, supra note 23, at 334; see also Robinson, supra note 27, at 
815.  A fifth term—strict liability—will not be discussed in this Note.  Strict or absolute 
liability is “liability imposed for faultless conduct” and, as such, does not involve a mens rea 
analysis. Id. at 820. 
 36. See Robinson & Dubber, supra note 23, at 335. 
 37. See Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal 
Liability:  The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 683, 688 (1983). 
 38. See id. at 693. 
 39. Robinson, supra note 27, at 850.  Robinson concluded by stating: 
[N]o matter how stable or advanced we may now feel, we are only part of someone 
else’s history. . . .  A later generation may perceive additional fundamental 
distinctions in culpability and provide greater application of current ones. . . .  [A]s 
the people of 844 recognized only two, the people of 2548 may feel justice cannot 
be done with less than eight. 
Id. at 853. 
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prominent doctrines of intoxication in American criminal law:  (1) MPC 
section 2.08, (2) the common law doctrine of specific intent, and (3) the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Montana v. Egelhoff.40 
1.  The MPC on Drugs:  Voluntary Intoxication 
The MPC addresses drug use in section 2.08, titled “Intoxication.”41  
Although often referred to as a defense or excuse, the MPC’s doctrine of 
intoxication is nearly the opposite.42  First, even when intoxication is 
applicable, it is not so much a defense as the absence of an offense, or the 
failure to establish proof of mens rea.43  Second, the MPC contracts 
intoxication’s scope as a defense by articulating “what amounts to an 
intoxication exception to the general rule that criminal liability requires a 
match between behavior and offense definition.”44  Intoxication is generally 
not an excuse for criminal conduct under the MPC45 because it cannot be 
used to negate recklessness46 and “recklessness is sufficient to establish 
mens rea for most offenses.”47 
Reflecting the views at the time it was adopted, the MPC’s intoxication 
section deals almost exclusively with intoxication due to alcohol.  
Throughout the Comments, drunkenness is frequently substituted for 
intoxication.48  But in the last portion of the Comments, the definition of 
“intoxication” is untethered from alcohol intoxication:  “The use of drugs or 
any other substance is to be treated in the same way as the use of 
alcohol.”49  A short statement about narcotics is all that follows as the 
Comment explains that the intoxication doctrine will have little practical 
bearing on crimes committed under the influence of narcotics, as “[t]he 
effect of a narcotic is to make the addict less aggressive without any great 
interference with mental powers.”50 
 
 40. 518 U.S. 37 (1996). 
 41. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08, at 349 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985).  The MPC defines intoxication as “a disturbance of mental or physical 
capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body.” Id. 
 42. See DUBBER, supra note 22, at 69. 
 43. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08, at 349 (“Intoxication of the actor is not a defense 
unless it negatives an element of the offense.”); DUBBER, supra note 22, at 69. 
 44. DUBBER, supra note 22, at 69. 
 45. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08, at 349.  Exceptions are involuntary intoxication, 
which is not self-induced, and pathological intoxication, which is “intoxication grossly 
excessive in degree, given the amount of the intoxicant, to which the actor does not know he 
is susceptible.” Id. § 2.08(5), at 349. 
 46. See id. § 2.08(2), at 349.  “When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, 
if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would have 
been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.” Id. 
 47. Id. § 2.08 cmt. 1, at 354. 
 48. See id. § 2.08 cmt. 1, at 352–59. 
 49. Id. § 2.08 cmt. 4, at 366. 
 50. Id. (emphasis added).  “Opiates are quieting drugs that repress hostile urges, create a 
passive, dreamy state and depress sexual drives. . . .  They allay anxieties and, therefore, 
supply a kind of a ‘dutch courage’ which . . . is achieved without any great deterioration in 
mental ability or manual dexterity . . . .” Id. (quoting COUNCIL ON MENTAL HEALTH,  AM. 
MED. ASS’N, REPORT ON NARCOTIC ADDICTION 24 (1957)). 
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Although devoting little space to drugs other than alcohol, the Comments 
discuss at length how the MPC’s intoxication doctrine (allowing negation 
of purpose and knowledge) is clearer than—yet substantively equal to—the 
common law’s approach.51 
2.  The Common Law on Drugs:  
Specific Intent Negation 
Prior to the nineteenth century, the common law did not allow any 
concession for intoxication in determining criminal liability.52  Due to the 
harsh effects of this standard, judges sought a workable compromise by 
which they might consider intoxication without undermining the entirety of 
the traditional mens rea analysis.53  Judge John Coleridge articulated this 
compromise in 1849 in noting that “evidence of voluntary intoxication was 
relevant only if it deprived the defendant of ‘the power of forming any 
specific intention.’”54  From here, the distinction between general and 
specific intent offenses originated, providing the basis for the intoxication 
doctrines followed by many states and courts. 
The distinction between general and specific intent “is a device, 
conceived at common law, to achieve a certain result rather than reflecting a 
coherent theory.”55  As a result, it is not possible to accurately frame 
general and specific intent within a complete, unitary theory.56  The most 
simple formulation is this:  specific-intent offenses are those that require 
proof that the defendant intended to bring about some additional 
consequence or social harm.57  The new common law rule allows negation 
of specific intent, but not general intent, offenses.58 
The ambiguous and “perhaps incoherent” specific intent doctrine 
developed in response to the harshness of a rule that prohibited 
consideration of intoxication in the mens rea analysis.59  The common law 
formulation is substantively equivalent to the Model Penal Code’s 
intoxication doctrine because crimes of recklessness and negligence are 
usually considered general intent offenses.60  Just as intoxication does not 
 
 51. See id. § 2.08 cmt. 1, at 353–56 (describing the distinction between specific and 
general intent as “obscure” and “vague,” but stating that the net effect of the MPC’s 
formulation and the usual formulation seems to be the same). 
 52. See Eric A. Johnson, Understanding General and Specific Intent:  Eight Things I 
Know for Sure, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 529 (2016). 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. (quoting Regina v. Monkhouse (1849) 4 Cox C.C. 55, 56). 
 55. Id. at 522 (quoting PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 65(e), at 298 
(1984)). 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. at 524–25.  Johnson’s illuminating article on general and specific intent 
describes a second category of offenses that qualify as specific intent offenses:  statutes that 
require “proof that the defendant ‘intended to commit some further act.’” Id. at 527–30. 
 58. See id. at 529. 
 59. Id. at 521, 529–30. 
 60. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. 1, at 353–56 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1985) (describing various offenses and how the net effects of the 
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negate a general intent offense under the common law, it does not negate 
recklessness or negligence under the MPC, whatever the effect the 
intoxication may have had on the awareness or knowledge of the actor.61  
At the heart of both doctrines is an attempt to acknowledge the potential for 
intoxication to alter one’s mens rea or mental culpability. 
3.  The Supreme Court on Drugs:  
Montana v. Egelhoff 
The leading U.S. Supreme Court case on voluntary intoxication, 
Montana v. Egelhoff,62 embodies a decidedly different approach.  In this 
case, a divided Court upheld a state law prohibiting consideration of 
voluntary intoxication in the determination of mens rea.63  The Court 
determined that such a law does not violate the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution, because the new common law rule—that intoxication may be 
considered for intent—is not “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of 
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”64  The Egelhoff decision 
revealed a Court fragmented over whether states may bar consideration of 
voluntary intoxication.65  With only a plurality decision, the narrow 
grounds on which Justice Ginsburg concurred established the holding of the 
Court.66  As discussed in Tidwell v. Cash,67 the Court “clearly established 
that when a state law barring consideration of voluntary intoxication can be 
characterized as a rule ‘[d]efining mens rea to eliminate the exculpatory 
value of voluntary intoxication,’ rather than as a rule of evidence, the statute 
does not offend the Due Process Clause.”68  In light of this ruling, a state 
does not have to prove purpose or knowledge in “a purely subjective sense” 
but may prove “circumstances that would otherwise establish knowledge or 
purpose ‘but for’ [the defendant’s] voluntary intoxication.”69  Thus, a 
defendant’s voluntary intoxication may be irrelevant to the mens rea 
analysis.70 
 
common law and MPC formulations are generally the same); Johnson, supra note 52, at 
532–38 (stating that “[c]rimes of recklessness and negligence are general-intent offenses”). 
 61. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2), at 349. 
 62. 518 U.S. 37 (1996). 
 63. See id. at 56. 
 64. See id. at 47–48; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall 
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). 
 65. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 37. 
 66. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a fragmented 
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.’” (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))). 
 67. No. EDCV 10-1883-AG RCF, 2012 WL 1570038 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2012), report 
and recommendation adopted, No. EDCV 10-1883-AG RCF, 2012 WL 1570032 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 30, 2012). 
 68. Id. at *10 (alteration in original) (quoting Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 58–59 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring)). 
 69. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 58 (Ginsburg, J. concurring). 
 70. See id. 
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The Court’s approach differs significantly from both the MPC’s 
intoxication doctrine71 and the specific-intent common law doctrine, which 
had been adopted by a majority of states before Egelhoff.72  While the MPC 
and common law doctrines of intoxication may limit the consideration of 
voluntary intoxication in the mens rea analysis, neither doctrine allows its 
complete elimination.73 
After Egelhoff, there is no clear prevailing doctrine among the states.74  
The diversity in approaches to the relationship between intoxication and 
mens rea, as emphasized by Justice Antonin Scalia in Egelhoff, reflects 
tensions between criminal law and virtues.75  The doctrine of mens rea 
“historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the 
tension between the evolving aims of criminal law and changing religious, 
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man.”76  Evolved 
understanding of the differences between intoxication and addiction—in 
particular, neuroscience findings that drug addiction results in catastrophic 
damage to the brain—may suggest such an adjustment for the mens rea 
analysis for drug-addicted criminal defendants. 
II.  METHAMPHETAMINE ADDICTION AND THE BRAIN 
Methamphetamine is a particularly addictive stimulant, abuse of which is 
associated with significant neurological damage and severe effects on 
cognitive and behavioral functioning.77  Popular use of methamphetamine 
has increased substantially in the last twenty years, in part due to the 
simplicity of producing the drug.78  In contrast to cocaine, which is derived 
naturally in Central and South America and then processed elsewhere, 
 
 71. See supra Part I.B. 
 72. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 48 (plurality opinion) (noting that only one-fifth of states 
either never adopted the common law intoxication rule or had recently abandoned it). 
 73. See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 74. Even a cursory search through statutes and court rules shows that some states use the 
common law rule, some the MPC’s, and some Egelhoff’s.  For example, California, New 
Mexico, and South Dakota follow the common law distinction between general and specific 
intent, while Connecticut, Maine, and Tennessee have a formulation similar to that of the 
MPC. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 29.4 (West 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-7 (West 
2017); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 37 (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-5-5 (2016); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-503 (West 2016); N.M. CT. R. 14-5105 (providing an updated 
uniform jury instruction with committee commentary).  Arizona, Indiana, and Montana do 
not allow evidence of voluntary intoxication to negate state of mind. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-503 (2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-2-5 (West 2016); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 45-2-203 (West 2017).  Hawaii “follows the position taken by Judge Learned Hand 
and a minority of the Model Penal Code Advisory Committee that the fact of intoxication 
‘should be admissible to prove or to disprove . . . mental state[] . . . whenever it is logically 
relevant,’” including recklessness. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 702-230 (West 2016) (quoting 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 cmt. 3, at 6–7 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959)). 
 75. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 56. 
 76. Id. (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536 (1968)). 
 77. See Bruce D. Homer et al., Methamphetamine Abuse and Impairment of Social 
Functioning:  A Review of the Underlying Neurophysiological Causes and Behavioral 
Implications, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 301, 301 (2008). 
 78. See Alasdair M. Barr et al., The Need for Speed:  An Update on Methamphetamine 
Addiction, 31 J. PSYCHIATRY & NEUROSCIENCE 301, 301 (2006). 
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methamphetamine can be manufactured on a large scale in the United 
States.79  The 2004 determination that methamphetamine was “the fastest-
growing illicit drug in North America”80 prompted Congress to pass the 
Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005.81  This act initially 
decreased methamphetamine availability by limiting access to its precursor 
chemicals, but production and use has been on the rise since 2011.82 
This part focuses on methamphetamine as a model drug through which to 
examine the relationship between drug addiction and mental states 
implicated in the mens rea analysis.83  Part II.A explains why this Note 
focuses on methamphetamine addiction, and Part II.B discusses the unique 
pattern of methamphetamine use and abuse, which illuminates the dramatic 
effect this addiction has on an individual’s life.  Part II.C then examines 
some of the significant neurophysiological changes associated with 
methamphetamine addiction and the correlative influence on behavior and 
mental state. 
A.  Why Focus on Methamphetamine? 
Methamphetamine tests the boundaries of criminal law because it can 
feature prominently in crimes unrelated to possession, use, and 
trafficking.84  Although the use of heroin, a narcotic, has skyrocketed in 
America,85 any amount of methamphetamine abuse remains critically 
important to the criminal justice system because its abuse drives violent 
crime.86  Where its abuse is prevalent, this stimulant’s relationship to 
 
 79. See Arthur K. Cho, Ice:  A New Dosage Form of an Old Drug, 249 SCIENCE 631, 
633 (1990).  Methamphetamine can be manufactured in a simple one-step process, in which 
either ephedrine or pseudophedrine is reduced. See id.  This method creates what is known 
colloquially as “crystal” or “ice,” due to the drug’s heightened purity as compared to the 
market’s previous methamphetamine. See id.  Prior to the emergence of “crystal meth,” 
synthesis was more commonly achieved through a condensation reaction between 
phenylacetone and methylamine, which resulted in a higher proportion of contaminants. See 
id. 
 80. Barr et al., supra note 78, at 308. 
 81. Pub. L. No. 111-268, 120 Stat. 192 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 830 (2012)). 
 82. See Jane Carlisle Maxwell & Mary-Lynn Brecht, Methamphetamine:  Here We Go 
Again?, 36 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 1168 (2011).  Once desired precursors were not available, 
methamphetamine manufacturers turned to different substrates.  When he could no longer 
obtain pseudophedrine, infamous fictional “cook” Walter White explained, “We’re not going 
to need pseudophedrine.  We’re going to make phenylacetone in a tube furnace, then we’re 
going to use reductive amination to yield methamphetamine.”  Breaking Bad:  A No-Rough-
Stuff-Type Deal (AMC television broadcast Mar. 9, 2008). 
 83. This Note uses methamphetamine as a paradigmatic drug.  The conclusions of this 
Note are not limited to methamphetamine addiction but focus on issues of drug addiction 
generally. 
 84. See infra notes 87, 95 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Pete Williams, DEA Finds Heroin Use Skyrocketing Across U.S., NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/dea-finds-heroin-use-skyrocketing-
n457336 [https://perma.cc/AP2K-3GGB]. 
 86. See id. 
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murders and armed robberies has been described as “truly frightening,” 
appearing to lead to “utterly irrational violence.”87 
Methamphetamine is a highly potent and addictive psychostimulant but is 
unique even among stimulants.88  It is easily manufactured with modest 
equipment and knowledge and is thus more widely available than most 
drugs.89  While cocaine predominantly affects one biological pathway,90 
methamphetamine “exerts multiple pharmacological effects via different 
molecular processes.”91  In addition, because methamphetamine’s 
elimination half-life is substantially longer than cocaine’s, 
methamphetamine exerts behavioral and psychological effects for 
significantly longer periods of time.92  In comparison to its parent 
compound, amphetamine, methamphetamine is lipophilic, which allows it 
to better penetrate the central nervous system.93  These characteristics have 
made the effects of methamphetamine abuse an area of focused study in 
several scientific fields.94 
Methamphetamine-addicted individuals are in prisons and on death row 
for committing crimes unrelated to drug possession, distribution, or 
manufacturing.95  In prosecuting these offenses, the state has the burden of 
proving that the defendant satisfies the required mens rea for each element 
of the offenses with which he has been charged.96  Thus, it is necessary to 
inquire whether these defendants’ methamphetamine addiction has any 
 
 87. Number of Crimes Committed by Methamphetamine Addicts ‘Truly Frightening,’ 
WA’s Top Judge Says, ABC RADIO PERTH (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/ 
2015-02-25/wa-chief-justice-says-ice-problem-truly-frightening/6261310 [https://perma.cc/ 
4U4L-GQTW].  In Western Australia, where methamphetamine is the “drug of choice,” 
Chief Justice Wayne Martin states that 95 percent of armed robberies and nearly half of 
murders could be attributed to methamphetamine abuse. Id.  Contributing to the spread of 
methamphetamine addiction is the ease with which it can be manufactured. See id.  As Chief 
Justice Martin said, “[You can] make it in about two hours out of the boot of your car, using 
a recipe you can get off the internet.” Id. 
 88. See generally J. Cobb Scott et al., Neurocognitive Effects of Methamphetamine:  A 
Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 17 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY REV. 275, 275 (2007). 
 89. See supra note 79. 
 90. Cocaine “works principally by blocking plasma membrane transporters that reuptake 
monoamines.” Barr et al., supra note 78, at 302. 
 91. Id.; see also infra Part II.C. 
 92. See Barr et al., supra note 78, at 302.  Cocaine has an elimination half-life of 1–3 
hours, while methamphetamine’s elimination half-life is 8–13 hours. See id. 
 93. See Homer et al., supra note 77, at 301. 
 94. See infra Part II.C. 
 95. See, e.g., Aja Goere, Murderer Who Traded Another Man’s “Life for 
Methamphetamine” Sentenced to Life in Prison, KPAX.COM (Dec. 6, 2016), 
http://www.kpax.com/story/33941625/murderer-who-traded-another-mans-life-for-
methamphetamine-sentenced-to-life-in-prison [https://perma.cc/DQ9H-UQG9]; Amy Renee 
Leiker, Oral Arguments Set in Death-Row Inmate’s Appeal, WICHITA EAGLE (Dec. 7, 2016), 
http://www.kansas.com/news/local/crime/article119462028.html (listing the status of death-
row inmates, including Scott Cheever, a methamphetamine addict whose sentence was 
upheld by the Kansas Supreme Court in July 2016) [https://perma.cc/VPE7-WHQ8]; Laura 
Zuckerman, Mother Sentenced to 12 Years in Baby’s Meth Death, POST REG. (Dec. 22, 
2016), http://www.postregister.com/articles/news-daily-email-todays-headlines-west/2016/ 
12/22/mother-sentenced-12-years-baby’s-meth [https://perma.cc/ZM5G-8RWT]. 
 96. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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significance within the mens rea analysis.  As the mens rea analysis requires 
a subjective determination of mental state, the effects of methamphetamine 
on the addicted user must first be examined for their potential to influence 
mental state. 
B.  The High, Binge, Tweak, and Crash:  
An Introduction to Methamphetamine Use and Abuse 
Methamphetamine addicts’ distinctive pattern of drug use highlights the 
drug’s dramatic effect on individual’s lives and informs a 
methamphetamine user’s experience over the course of four stages:  the 
high, the binge, the tweak, and the crash.97 
When methamphetamine first enters the body, the person experiences 
“the high,” which is characterized by an immediate rush of pleasure lasting 
for a matter of minutes, “followed by a euphoria that lasts for up to 12 
hours.”98  During the high, the user may experience heightened confidence, 
assertiveness, productivity, energy, attentiveness, and curiosity, but he may 
also experience increased aggression, anxiety, and insomnia.99  As the high 
fades, most users will continue to consume methamphetamine every few 
hours to maintain feelings of euphoria in “the binge” period.  A typical user 
may dose between one and six times a day, but with each dose of 
methamphetamine, there is less of a rush in response until, eventually, there 
is no rush at all.100  Users will typically self-administer methamphetamine 
until they either run out of the drug or choose to stop dosing, usually due to 
the lack of a rush as a result of tolerance.101  Users may not eat or sleep at 
all during the binge, which can last from three to fifteen days.102 
It is the detrimental physical effects of “the tweak” that most people 
associate with methamphetamine use and abuse.103  In this stage, high 
adrenaline causes the user to engage in obsessive behavior.104  The user 
 
 97. See Stephanie C. LoConto, Methamphetamine:  The Physical Effects, PROSECUTOR, 
Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 30, 30–31 (providing a broad overview of the physical effects of 
methamphetamine). 
 98. Id. at 30 (explaining that the neurotransmitters dopamine, epinephrine, 
norepinephrine, and serotonin modulate the user’s experience of the high due to 
methamphetamine’s inhibition of neurotransmitter reuptake into the nerve terminal). 
 99. See id.; see also Homer, supra note 77, at 301. 
 100. See LoConto, supra note 97, at 30–31; see also Homer, supra note 77, at 302. 
 101. See Barr et al., supra note 78, at 303. 
 102. See LoConto, supra note 97, at 31.  Interestingly, recent historical research has 
revealed that Nazi soldiers were regularly supplied with methamphetamine, sold in Germany 
as a pill named Pervitin, throughout World War II for this purpose. See David Segal, High 
on Hitler and Meth:  Book Says Nazis Were Fueled by Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/books/high-on-hitler-and-meth-book-says-nazis-were-
fueled-by-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/FR3C-TF4P].  “Hopped-up soldiers would sprint 
tirelessly through the Ardennes at the onset of war, an adrenalized performance that left 
Winston Churchill ‘dumbfounded,’ as he wrote in his memoirs.  A German general would 
later gloat that his men had stayed awake for 17 straight days.” Id. 
 103. See Meth’s Devastating Effects:  Before and After, CBS NEWS, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/meths-devastating-effects-before-and-after/ (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6RZ2-P66C]. 
 104. See LoConto, supra note 97, at 31. 
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may experience formication—the unnerving feeling that bugs are crawling 
under the skin—which “causes the user to pick out skin until sores and cuts, 
known as ‘crank bugs,’ arise.  The user can also become physically 
aggressive, while simultaneously experiencing a psychosis that is 
characterized by a deluded and paranoid thought process.”105  The last stage 
of methamphetamine use is “the crash,” a period of extreme somnolence in 
which the user may sleep for up to three days.106 
Repeatedly subjecting the body and brain to this pattern of drug use 
results in catastrophic damage to bodily systems.  Recent neuroscience 
research has focused on key brain areas damaged by methamphetamine 
abuse and associated changes in cognition and behavior. 
C.  Your Brain on Methamphetamine:  Neurophysiological Changes 
and Associated Cognitive and Behavioral Deficits 
Neurophysiological research has revealed that methamphetamine 
addiction causes global neural impairment, with catastrophic damage to key 
neural structures and deficits in associated cognition and behaviors.107  This 
section discusses one of the severe effects of methamphetamine addiction—
damage to a critical neurotransmitter system—and resultant neurocognitive 
and behavioral deficits. 
1.  Methamphetamine Addiction Causes Severe Damage 
to the Critical Dopaminergic System 
Long-term methamphetamine abuse leads to catastrophic brain changes 
that are due, in part, to the drug’s neurotoxicity.108  Methamphetamine has 
severe neurotoxic effects on neurotransmitter systems, particularly 
dopamine circuits109—which predominate in the striatum of the brain110—
and serotonin circuits in the frontal cortex and hippocampus.111  There are 
several pathways by which methamphetamine might exert its neurotoxic 
effects.112  Much of the scientific literature focuses on dopamine pathways 
because methamphetamine’s ability to regulate dopamine transmission 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 31. 
 107. See, e.g., Barr et al., supra note 78; Homer et al., supra note 77. 
 108. See Barr et al., supra note 78, at 304–05; Homer et al., supra note 77, at 302. 
 109. See Min Lin et al., Methamphetamine Regulation of Firing Activity of Dopamine 
Neurons, 36 J. NEUROSCIENCE 10,376, 10,376 (2016). 
 110. See Linda Chang et al., Structural and Metabolic Brain Changes in the Striatum 
Associated with Methamphetamine Abuse, 102 ADDICTION 16, 16 (2007) (noting that 
“striatal structures have the highest densities of dopaminergic synapses, which are the major 
sites of action for methamphetamine”).  Striatal structures, sometimes called the basal 
ganglia, include the putamen, globus pallidus, nucleus accumbens, and caudate nucleus. See 
id. at 16–17. 
 111. See Barr et al., supra note 78, at 306; Thomas E. Nordahl et al., Neuropsychological 
Effects of Chronic Methamphetamine Use on Neurotransmitters and Cognition:  A Review, 
15 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 317, 319 (2003); Scott et al., supra 
note 88, at 278–79. 
 112. See Nordahl et al., supra note 111 (discussing methamphetamine-induced 
neurotoxicity). 
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through multiple mechanisms contributes to the drug’s effects as a general 
neurotoxin.113 
Methamphetamine causes an initial surge in dopamine levels,114 resulting 
in the pleasurable effects of the methamphetamine high.  It accomplishes 
this, in part, by acting as a substrate115 for the dopamine transporter, which 
increases extracellular, or active, dopamine levels116 and increasing the 
excitability of dopaminergic neurons.117  In response to this dopamine 
surge, the brain circuitry compensates by decreasing dopamine 
transmission.118  The combined effects of long-term dopamine 
overexposure and methamphetamine neurotoxicity result in catastrophic 
degeneration of dopaminergic nerve terminals and depletion of dopamine in 
the central nervous system.119  Similar effects are seen on serotonergic 
neural circuits.120 
Key brain areas that are impaired by methamphetamine addiction include 
the striatum, amygdala, and prefrontal cortex, as these areas rely on 
dopaminergic and serotonergic pathways.121  The impairment of the 
functioning of dopaminergic-dense and serotonergic-dense structures in the 
brain, which is just one of the many neurophysiological effects of 
methamphetamine addiction, has associated neurological, social-cognitive, 
and behavioral deficits.122 
 
 113. See Lin et al., supra note 109, at 10,376. 
 114. See David Sulzer et al., Mechanisms of Neurotransmitter Release by Amphetamines:  
A Review, 75 NEUROBIOLOGY 406 (2005) (describing how the drug class of amphetamines 
causes the release of neurotransmitters). 
 115. A substrate is a substance acted upon by an enzyme. See Substrate, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/substrate (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/EC8X-WCZJ].  As a substrate, methamphetamine 
directly interacts with the dopamine transporter to stimulate dopamine efflux. See Lin et al., 
supra note 109, at 10,376. 
 116. See Lin et al., supra note 109, at 10,376.  Methamphetamine “increases extracellular 
dopamine levels by competing with dopamine uptake and increasing reverse transport of 
dopamine via the transporter.” Id. 
 117. See id.  Methamphetamine regulates the excitability of dopaminergic neurons by 
altering membrane channel activity. See id. at 10,387–89.  Methamphetamine also stimulates 
an initial increase in firing activity of dopamine neurons, which is followed by a prolonged 
decrease. See id. at 10,389. 
 118. See Nordahl et al., supra note 111, at 319. 
 119. See id. 
 120. See Yoshimoto Sekine et al., Brain Serotonin Transporter Density and Aggression in 
Abstinent Methamphetamine Abusers, 63 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 90 (2006) (discussing 
the effect of methamphetamine addiction on serotonin transporter density in the brain). 
 121. See generally Barr et al., supra note 78; Homer et al., supra note 77. 
 122. See, e.g., Barr et al., supra note 78, at 306; Homer et al., supra note 77, at 303; 
Buyean Lee et al., Striatal Dopamine D2/D3 Receptor Availability Is Reduced in 
Methamphetamine Dependence and Is Linked to Impulsivity, 29 J. NEUROSCIENCE 14,734 
(2009); Kyoji Okita et al., Emotion Dysregulation and Amygdala Dopamine D2-Type 
Receptor Availability in Methamphetamine Users, 161 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 163 
(2016). 
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2.  Methamphetamine Addiction:  
Emotion Dysregulation, Aggression, Impulsivity, and Psychosis 
The neurological damage caused by methamphetamine addiction is 
associated with social-cognitive impairments, such as emotion 
dysregulation, and associated maladaptive behaviors, including impulsivity, 
aggression, and even psychosis.  Emotion dysregulation is the suboptimal 
modulation of operations that influence responses during emotion 
processing, particularly in response to provocation.123  Emotional regulation 
is a primary function of the amygdala, which is rich in D2-type dopamine 
receptors,124 and the prefrontal cortex, which contributes to response 
inhibition and contains both dopaminergic and serotonergic pathways.125  
Emotion regulation is also influenced by activity in the striatum—rich in 
D2/D3-type dopamine receptors—which is implicated in controlling 
delayed gratification and impulsivity.126  Increased severity of addiction is 
correlated with increased emotional dysregulation and associated behavioral 
disturbances.127 
Emotion dysregulation is associated with impulsivity and increased 
propensity for aggression and violence.128  Dopamine influences 
impulsivity, “a category of behaviors encompassing deficits in the ability to 
delay immediate gratification for future larger rewards, and in response 
inhibition.”129  The loss of striatal dopamine activity in methamphetamine 
abusers contributes to the high impulsivity and lack of inhibition control 
observed in these individuals.130  In addition, the striatal dopamine system 
is crucial to processing probabilistic information.131  Therefore, 
methamphetamine-addicted individuals do not process or learn from the 
 
 123. See Okita et al., supra note 122, at 164. 
 124. See id. at 163–64. 
 125. See Nordahl et al., supra note 111, at 319, 321–22. 
 126. See generally Michael E. Ballard et al., Low Dopamine D2/D3 Receptor 
Availability Is Associated with Steep Discounting of Delayed Rewards in 
Methamphetamine Dependence, INT’L J. NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 1 (May 2015), 
https://academic.oup.com/ijnp/article/675342/Low-Dopamine-D2-D3-Receptor-Availability-
is [https://perma.cc/P8ZG-DLD2]. 
 127. See Okita et al., supra note 122, at 166.  Decreased D2-type dopamine receptor 
signaling in the midbrain and striatum—in addition to the amygdala—is also associated with 
high impulsivity in methamphetamine-addicted individuals. See M. Kohno et al., Midbrain 
Functional Connectivity and Ventral Striatal Dopamine D2-Type Receptors:  Link to 
Impulsivity in Methamphetamine Users, 21 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 1554, 1554 (2016). 
 128. See Okita et al., supra note 122, at 164. 
 129. Lee et al., supra note 122, at 14,734. 
 130. See id. at 14,734–35, 14,738 (finding a fundamental negative correlation between 
impulsivity and striatal D2/D3 receptor in humans and suggesting that methamphetamine’s 
negative impact on the D2/D3 receptor system promotes impulsivity); see also Kohno et al., 
supra note 127, at 1557–58 (finding upregulation of midbrain activity—likely through the 
combination of low striatal D2-type receptor availability, reduced dopamine availability, and 
reduced GABAergic inhibitory feedback in methamphetamine-addicted individuals—to be 
positively correlated with impulsivity). 
 131. See Uri Maoz & Gideon Yaffe, What Does Recent Neuroscience Tell Us About 
Criminal Responsibility?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 120, 135–36 (2016). 
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probability of risk in the same way as nonaddicted individuals.132  This lack 
of inhibition and failure to perceive risk is associated with increased 
aggression and violence133 but is not the sole factor behind these behaviors. 
Aggression and violence are associated with disturbances in emotional 
regulation, response inhibition, facial affect recognition, self-awareness, 
and theory of mind, all of which have been demonstrated in 
methamphetamine-dependent individuals.134  Methamphetamine addicts 
themselves perceive the drug as contributing to their violence, specifically 
attributing this to the drug decreasing their ability to empathize and its 
tendency to dominate every aspect of their life.135  Neurobiologically, 
aggression is associated with defects in the emotion-processing circuitry 
between the amygdala and prefrontal cortex.136  Methamphetamine addicts 
show severe structural, neurochemical, and metabolic abnormalities in this 
circuitry.137  Scientific models of aggression suggest that aggression is 
increased where there is failure of either emotional regulation or emotional 
insight.138  Methamphetamine addiction impairs both these processes, 
which contributes to methamphetamine addicts’ aggression, as they may 
misinterpret stimuli as hostile and threatening.139 
The effects of methamphetamine addiction can become so severe as to 
result in methamphetamine-induced psychosis.  Acute methamphetamine 
intoxication may have transient psychosis-inducing effects that are “almost 
indistinguishable from acute paranoid schizophrenia,” including 
hallucinations and delusions.140  The high drug doses associated with 
 
 132. See id. 
 133. See Doris E. Payer et al., Neural Correlates of Affect Processing and Aggression in 
Methamphetamine Dependence, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 271, 272 (2011). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Mary-Lynn Brecht & Diane M. Herbeck, Methamphetamine Use and Violent 
Behavior:  User Perceptions and Predictors, 43 J. DRUG ISSUES 468, 477–78 (2013); see 
also Payer et al., supra note 133, at 277 (replicating findings that methamphetamine-
dependent individuals self-report higher aggression than controls do). 
 136. See Payer et al., supra note 133, at 272. 
 137. See id.; Sekine et al., supra note 120, at 90 (“Protracted abuse of methamphetamine 
may reduce the density of the serotonin transporter in the brain, leading to elevated 
aggression, even in currently abstinent abusers.”). 
 138. See Payer et al., supra note 133, at 278–79.  Scientific models of aggression translate 
internal states into either impulsive aggression or thoughtful action, both of which may be 
influenced by methamphetamine addiction. See id. at 271. 
 139. See id. at 279.  This study found a particular region of the prefrontal cortex—the 
ventral interior frontal gyrus (IFG)—to be implicated in impaired emotional insight in 
methamphetamine addicts. See id.  The ventral IFG plays an important role in influencing 
behavioral outcomes and modulating the fight-or-flight responses of the hypothalamus. See 
id. 
 140. Rebecca McKetin et al., The Profile of Psychiatric Symptoms Exacerbated by 
Methamphetamine Use, 161 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 104, 104 (2016).  This study 
sought to differentiate psychiatric symptoms induced by methamphetamine use from those 
caused by preexisting psychiatric disorders. See id. at 105.  Methamphetamine use did not 
induce the negative symptoms associated with schizophrenia—diminished emotional 
expression or avolition—but did increase the severity of many psychiatric symptoms, 
including positive psychotic symptoms (hallucinations and persecutory delusions), affective 
symptoms (depression, suicidality, hostility, and self-neglect), and psychomotor agitation. 
See id. at 107–08. 
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addiction may result in an enduring psychosis that persists even after the 
drug has been eliminated from the bloodstream.141  Even individuals who 
recover from the prolonged psychosis may suffer “flashbacks” of psychotic 
symptoms when confronted with stressful situations.142  Methamphetamine-
induced psychosis is often cited by experts testifying on behalf of violent 
methamphetamine-addicted criminal defendants.143 
Methamphetamine addiction results in catastrophic brain damage to 
critical neural circuits and structures.  Associated with this damage are 
corresponding cognitive and behavioral deficits linked to long-term 
methamphetamine addiction, which are distinct from effects due to acute 
intoxication.  This may suggest that addiction, particularly to 
methamphetamine, should be handled in a different manner than 
intoxication in the mens rea analysis. 
III.  THE MENS REA PROBLEM FOR DRUG-ADDICTED 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS:  DIFFERENTIATING ADDICTION 
FROM CRIMINAL LAW’S INTOXICATION DOCTRINES 
American criminal law has various approaches to the effect of 
intoxication on mens rea, including a Supreme Court ruling from over 
twenty years ago that allows states to prohibit consideration of intoxication 
in the mens rea analysis.144  But if methamphetamine addiction results in 
dramatic brain changes, as supported by the neuroscience findings 
discussed above, should its effect on mental culpability be considered in the 
mens rea analysis in a different way than acute intoxication? 
This part discusses the arguments for and against differentiating between 
acute intoxication and addiction.  Part III.A looks at whether addiction 
should be considered “voluntary” and thus subject to the same doctrines 
that govern voluntary intoxication.  Part III.B discusses whether addiction 
affects mental state and, if so, whether disallowing consideration of 
addiction in the mens rea analysis improperly elevates actus reus and 
violates due process.  Then, Part III.C addresses whether pragmatic 
concerns about juries’ ability to make fine culpability distinctions support 
rejection of neuroscience in the courtroom. 
A.  The Nuances of Voluntary Addiction 
The legal doctrines of intoxication represent an exception to the general 
tenet of criminal law that liability requires a match between behavior and 
 
 141. See Barr et al., supra note 78, at 306. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See, e.g., Bonnifield v. Lewis, No. C 12-3857 PJH (PR), 2014 WL 1101658, at *4–5 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (describing expert testimony that the defendant had “damaged 
himself irretrievably due to decades of methamphetamine abuse” and was experiencing a 
“drug-induced psychosis,” which lasted even when the drug had exited his system); Malone 
v. Oklahoma, 168 P.3d 185, 195 (Okla. Crim. App. 2007) (recounting the testimony of Dr. 
David Smith, who stated that the effect on a person of “amphetamine psychosis” is 
comparable to paranoid schizophrenia). 
 144. See generally Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996); supra Part I.B. 
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offense mental state requirements.145  Under Egelhoff, the state does not 
have to prove mens rea in “a purely subjective sense,” but it may instead 
prove circumstances that would otherwise establish the required mens rea 
“but for” the intoxication.146  The question is whether this exception should 
extend to addiction, thus encompassing addiction within the doctrines of 
intoxication.  Is addiction as voluntary as intoxication? 
Limiting the legal relevance of intoxication to the mens rea analysis is 
generally justified by voluntariness:  an individual should not be found less 
blameworthy for conduct committed while in a voluntarily induced 
intoxicated state.147  “The law accepts free will and blame-worthiness as a 
general premise,” and will rarely depart from that presumption.148  The 
legal exception to this tenet, regarding issues of capacity, arises where the 
defendant’s incapacitated state is seemingly out of his control and cannot be 
deterred.149  By contrast, imbibing intoxicating substances is considered a 
choice and gross intoxication a moral failing.150 
Deterrence is a clear goal of doctrines that limit or eliminate the 
relevance of voluntary intoxication to the mens rea analysis.  The MPC 
Comments acknowledge that, even if intoxication does affect an 
individual’s awareness of risk, “[b]ecoming so drunk as to destroy 
temporarily the actor’s powers of perception and judgment is conduct that 
plainly has no affirmative social value . . . .  The actor’s moral culpability 
lies in engaging in such conduct.”151  In the Egelhoff plurality opinion, 
Justice Scalia emphasized that a rule disallowing consideration of voluntary 
intoxication acts as a general deterrent, a specific deterrent (in the form of 
incarceration), and “comports with and implements society’s moral 
perception that one who has voluntarily impaired his own faculties should 
be responsible for the consequences.”152 
The issues of deterrence and voluntariness, however, may require a 
distinction between acute intoxication and addiction.  The deterrent effects 
of intoxication doctrines may not apply to addiction due to the disconnect 
between the act of drug use and the resultant condition of addiction.153  
 
 145. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 58 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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2436 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
Only some individuals who experiment with drugs become addicted.154  
Contrast this with intoxication, where the ingestion of intoxicating 
substances is directly and temporally related to the inducement of an 
intoxicated state.155  Because of this causal connection, doctrines seeking to 
deter offenses committed while intoxicated can effectively deter the act of 
becoming intoxicated.156  But the same is not true for addiction.157  This 
difference in causality suggests that deterrence is not a likely outcome of 
addressing addiction under current doctrines of intoxication. 
Furthermore, neuroscience findings posit that neither the initiation nor 
maintenance of addiction is voluntary in the same way as is the act of 
ingesting a substance to become acutely intoxicated.158  Drug-addicted 
individuals and nonaddicted individuals may seek drugs for vastly different 
reasons:  while a nonaddicted individual may seek the “high” or stress-
relieving effects of the drug, an addict is fulfilling a need.159  As one former 
addict recounted, “While actively using, I don’t care about you, I don’t care 
about myself, and I sure as hell don’t care about no police. . . .  I was using 
against my will because once you’re in that lifestyle, it totally consumes 
you.  We don’t even think about the consequences.”160  While doctrines of 
intoxication might fairly impute a mental state for voluntarily choosing to 
become intoxicated, the justification for doing so does not apply to 
addiction. 
The emergence of drug addiction in an individual “is ultimately a 
function of interactions between drug effects, biological and environmental 
factors, which are crucially influenced by the developmental stage of the 
individual.”161  The development of addiction is in part mediated by the 
dopaminergic system which, as discussed above, is catastrophically altered 
by methamphetamine use.162  “Repeated use of the drug changes the brain 
of the user so that behaviors become more reflexive and, consequently, 
much less amenable to cognitive interference.”163  The entire system of 
processing risk and reward becomes compromised.164  Acute drug intake 
increases dopamine release, which is followed by marked decreases in 
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 164. See id. at 560. 
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drug-addicted individuals.165  This pattern of dopamine flux becomes 
conditionally associated with other stimuli or cues, until the stimuli 
themselves are able to stimulate dopamine release and a strong desire for 
the drug.166  Even with knowledge of the negative effects of the drug, this 
positive feedback loop makes an addict in remission extremely vulnerable 
and at high risk of relapse when exposed to any number of previously 
neutral stimuli.167 
Furthermore, increased severity of addiction is associated with increased 
severity of deficits in coping with stress.168  Deficits in coping with stress 
are strongly related to drug craving, and the involvement of several 
neurotransmitter systems in that relationship has been shown not only for 
users of methamphetamine but also for those who use cocaine, heroin, 
alcohol, and tobacco.169  The emotion dysregulation associated with drug 
abuse contributes to the maintenance of addiction, which in turn contributes 
to increased severity of dysregulation.170  This positive feedback loop 
makes recovery from addiction incredibly difficult—and relapse likely171—
and highlights the differences between acute intoxication and the significant 
neurological effects of long-term addiction.  These effects suggest that 
neither the initiation nor maintenance of addiction is voluntary and that 
addiction is not a moral failing, but a biological one. 
B.  Does Addiction Affect Mens Rea? 
Even if addiction is not voluntary, it has been argued that there is no 
effect of addiction on mens rea.  As it was described by one scholar: 
[A]ddicts . . . will not lack mens rea for their substance-related criminal 
activity . . . .  In most cases of serious criminal wrongdoing . . . there still 
will be no mens rea problem.  An addict who burgles, robs, or kills surely 
forms the intent to do so.172 
The MPC agrees, stating that there is a “relative rarity of cases where 
intoxication really does engender unawareness as distinguished from 
imprudence.”173  Courts have employed similar reasoning when faced with 
acts committed by methamphetamine-addicted individuals.  In denying a 
writ of habeas corpus for a man sentenced to death, a Texas court 
determined that no reasonable juror would have found the man’s mental 
impairments—including a chronic methamphetamine addiction and 
thirteen-day methamphetamine binge—negated the intent or knowledge 
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required for a capital murder conviction.174  In granting a certificate of 
appealability for ineffective assistance of counsel,175 a California court 
found the prisoner had not made a substantial showing that trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to present the defense of mental defect due to 
long-term drug abuse but had made a showing that counsel was ineffective 
for failing to do the same for a mental defect due to causes other than long-
term drug use.176  The court was not convinced that a reasonable juror 
would have ruled differently had counsel argued at the guilt phase of trial 
that the defendant’s long-term methamphetamine addiction had caused 
brain damage that prevented him from forming an intent to kill.177  This 
distinction illuminates the court’s opinion that a reasonable juror would not 
believe long-term methamphetamine addiction might cause a mental defect 
that negates mens rea, even if said juror might believe that a mental defect 
due to a different, non-drug-related cause can negate mens rea.178 
The severe effects of methamphetamine addiction on the brain and 
associated cognitive and behavioral deficits, however, suggest that 
addiction does affect mens rea.179  The distinctions among the culpability 
terms of the MPC and terms used in state and federal jurisdictions lie along 
the axes of attitude and probability.180  For purposely and knowingly, the 
distinction is one of attitude:  conscious object versus awareness.181  The 
Comments make this explicit, stating that “action is not 
purposive . . . unless it was [the actor’s] conscious object to perform an 
action of that nature or to cause such a result.  It is meaningful to think of 
the actor’s attitude as different.”182  In contrast, the distinction between 
knowingly and recklessly is one of probability:  practically certain versus 
substantial risk.183  While both involve awareness of risk, recklessness 
involves risk “of a probability less than substantial certainty” that is 
“unjustifiable.”184  Finally, the distinction between recklessly and 
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negligently is one of awareness.185  While acting recklessly involves 
“conscious risk creation,”186 a person acts negligently “when he 
inadvertently creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of which he ought 
to be aware.”187  The question is whether methamphetamine addiction 
influences the ability to form any of these mental states. 
Methamphetamine addiction results in organic brain damage to key 
pathways and structures that influence cognition and behavior, contributing 
to emotion dysregulation, impulsivity, deficits in risk and reward 
processing, and characteristics of psychosis.188  Each of these deficits may 
influence an individual’s ability to form an offense’s requisite mens rea.  
For intent, an impulsive individual, who struggles to inhibit his response to 
provocation and misapprehends the world as a dangerous place,189 may not 
have the “conscious object” to cause, for example, the death of another 
human or may not be practically certain that such result will occur, as 
required for knowledge.190  If the deficits are severe enough, such an 
individual may not even satisfy the requirements of recklessness, because 
he may not be capable of comprehending the existence of a risk.191  It is 
only negligence, the objective culpability term, for which addiction can 
categorically be stated to have no effect.192  Therefore, particularly 
depending on the severity of the addiction, neuroscience research suggests 
that methamphetamine addiction may have a significant effect on the ability 
of a criminal defendant to form an offense’s requisite mental state. 
Some have maligned the argument that addiction should be considered in 
the mens rea analysis, even if it does influence mens rea,193 because drug 
users are aware of the risk of addiction and can “fairly be held responsible 
to a substantial degree for becoming addicted.”194  While the close temporal 
relationship between ingesting an intoxicant and committing acts while 
intoxicated might justify such liability under the legal doctrines of 
intoxication,195 addiction is distinguished by the more tenuous connection 
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between the initial acts contributing to one’s status as an addict and acts 
committed months, or even years, later.196  “Very few [individuals 
becoming addicts] would in fact foresee committing specific 
crimes . . . .  [E]ven if addicts are mostly responsible for becoming addicted 
and may be aware of the general risks addiction poses, this responsibility is 
different from the responsibility necessary to be culpable for specific 
crimes.”197  Therefore, imputing the mental state involved in becoming an 
addict to the offense’s requisite mens rea is inappropriate.  Neither the 
“conduct” nor “moral culpability” of becoming addicted to drugs—as is 
used to justify intoxication doctrines by the MPC and Egelhoff, 
respectively198— justifies assigning liability regardless of mens rea to drug-
addicted criminal defendants. 
In Egelhoff, the Court determined that excising voluntary intoxication 
from the mens rea analysis—regardless of the actual effect of intoxication 
on mental state—did not violate due process because the right to have 
intoxication considered on issues of intent is not fundamental.199  However, 
the requirement that criminal defendants satisfy offenses’ mens rea 
requirements to be found guilty—and the intended subjectivity of that 
analysis—may be so rooted in the conscience of the American people as to 
be fundamental.200  The mens rea analysis examines the subjective mental 
state of the criminal defendant.201  Excluding the negating evidence of 
addiction on mental state selectively redefines an offense to allow the 
defendant at issue to be found guilty on objective standards, while 
subjective standards apply to everyone else.202  This creates a mere legal 
fiction, as “[s]uch concealed redefinition [of the offense] permits the 
illusion that the defendant was convicted on the basis of a subjective mental 
state, and so permits the enhanced punishment attendant upon such 
increased culpability.”203 
Furthermore, imputing the mens rea for becoming an addict to crimes 
committed once addicted is a form of strict liability,204 as it assigns liability 
for actus reus with no regard for mens rea.205  For at least 800 years, 
criminal law has focused on both the criminal act and the criminal mind.206  
In the American criminal justice system, mental state is as important an 
element as the act itself in justifying criminal liability.207  Ignoring a 
defendant’s addiction in the mens rea analysis, where it has been 
established that such a condition results in lasting brain damage that may 
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affect mental state, likely violates a defendant’s fundamental right to due 
process.  While intoxication is a voluntary, transient condition—potentially 
justifying imputing the mens rea of becoming intoxicated to an act 
committed minutes or hours later—addiction endures.208  If the effects of 
addiction cannot be considered in evaluating mental state, the act alone is 
sufficient to establish liability.209  Such a result is not consistent with 
traditions in criminal responsibility, suggesting that the due process analysis 
for drug-addicted individuals should be differentiated from that of voluntary 
intoxication in Egelhoff.210 
Outlawing consideration of the effects of addiction in the mens rea 
analysis likely violates a fundamental right, regardless of the status of the 
doctrines of voluntary intoxication, in light of both the neuroscience 
research suggesting that methamphetamine addiction does affect mens rea 
as well as criminal law’s concern with subjective mental state.  However, 
even where the law acknowledges a right as fundamental, it may be 
restricted where the state can demonstrate a compelling interest.211  One 
such interest may be in reliable and efficient fact-finding. 
C.  Pragmatic Problems of Presenting Neuroscience to the Jury 
Jurors are the court’s fact-finders and the foundation of evidentiary law is 
in circumscribing what can and cannot be set before the jury.  Scientific 
evidence—particularly neuroscience—is often treated as presenting a 
distinct risk.212  In the courtroom, presenting brain scans to validate expert 
testimony is often met with resistance, “as if [defendants’] experts’ 
interpretations of brain scans are somehow less reliable than their experts’ 
unsubstantiated testimony.”213  Lawyers and nonlawyers alike are 
concerned that neuroscience is “too complex and too technical” for 
ordinary, untrained people to understand and apply.214  Or they worry that 
the evidence will be used to draw overbroad inferences about individual 
actors from data collected in group studies.215  The suggestion is that the 
pragmatic problems posed by such evidence justify its limitation. 
There is a belief among some courts and scholars that allowing evidence 
of intoxication—and by extension, addiction—to disprove mental state is 
particularly dangerous because juries cannot make subtle culpability 
distinctions and are unduly influenced by scientific evidence.216  
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“[N]euroscientific evidence should not be used to make fine-grained 
culpability assessments at trial.  It is beyond the qualifications of the jury in 
our adversarial system of justice to make nuanced distinctions about where 
a qualifying agent falls on the capacity spectrum.”217  However, the juror 
does just that—make nuanced distinctions—in evaluating mental state in 
every criminal trial.  This fact-finding is precisely within the responsibility 
and capability of the jury. 
However, courts have expressed unease about juries’ capabilities as 
well.218  Of particular concern to the Supreme Court is the possibility that 
juries are unduly influenced by scientific evidence.  In Egelhoff, Justice 
Scalia noted that laws prohibiting consideration of intoxication in the mens 
rea analysis are even more justified in modern times because juries 
presented with evidence of intoxication “will be too quick to accept the 
claim that the defendant was biologically incapable of forming the requisite 
mens rea.”219  Neurological images from magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) scans—with their bright 
colors and perceived legitimacy—are often considered particularly 
dangerous in their ability to confuse the jury.220 
Interestingly, the opposite reasoning has been used to justify withholding 
from the jury evidence of the effects of intoxication on mental states.  For 
example, a Minnesota court remarked that “we treat expert testimony on 
intoxication and mental illness cases much the same. . . .  [E]xpert opinion 
testimony about the general effects of mental illness or intoxication is 
ordinarily inadmissible because most jurors have some experience with 
these conditions.”221  While in some cases neuroscience evidence is 
inadmissible for its potential to confuse an unknowing jury, it is 
inadmissible in others because the jury naturally has such knowledge.  This 
seasonal treatment suggests that it is the category of evidence itself, not its 
potential value to the fact-finder, that influences its admissibility. 
Other scholars strongly disagree with limiting neuroscience evidence in 
the courtroom.  Professor Deborah W. Denno, Founding Director of the 
Neuroscience and Law Center at Fordham University School of Law, 
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wrote, “[A]lthough neuroscience brings unique insight to the law, there is 
nothing about neuroscience that merits unique treatment by the law.”222  
Others maintain that the best way to rectify concerns about jurors’ ability to 
distinguish between mens rea culpabilities is by improving jury 
instructions.223  One study found that small differences in wording of the 
language used to communicate mens rea to jurors can significantly improve 
accuracy in distinguishing between culpable mental states.224  This suggests 
that careful construction of jury instructions on mens rea, the effects of 
addiction, and the application of neuroscience evidence would likely 
alleviate most of the concerns about juror’s distinguishing capabilities.225  
As Minnesota Supreme Court Judge Sandra Gardebring articulated, 
“Though a subjective state of mind may at times be difficult to determine, 
there is no mystery to mens rea, the latinism notwithstanding.  Jurors in 
their everyday lives constantly make judgments on whether the conduct of 
others was intentional or accidental, premeditated or not.”226  Judge David 
L. Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit advocated a similar position.227  In 
determining culpability, he acknowledged that there is “no simple, scientific 
formula that will provide a clear-cut answer to every case” and stated that 
we should just tell jurors the truth:  the jury is to judge the defendant’s 
blameworthiness, there is no “calibrated, easily-applied standard” to guide 
their decision, and the question must be resolved with reference to the 
jury’s “own understanding of community concepts of blameworthiness.”228 
While allowing the consideration of addiction in the mens rea analysis 
may complicate the jury’s assignation of liability, this is an insufficiently 
compelling reason to eliminate such consideration altogether.  Renowned 
criminal law scholar Paul H. Robinson stated eloquently:  “I agree that 
complexity is to be avoided as much as possible. . . .  But in the end, the 
proper distribution of liability sometimes depends upon a concept that is 
complex. . . .  The law must be as complicated as are our notions of 
justice.”229  Justice requires that criminal law incorporate scientific findings 
into culpability analyses rather than ignore such discoveries for the sake of 
simplicity. 
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IV.  THE CASE FOR A DOCTRINE OF ADDICTION 
This part advocates for a doctrine of addiction that adopts neuroscience 
findings of the impact of addiction on cognition and behavior and 
acknowledges addiction’s potential to affect mens rea.  Specifically, this 
Note argues that addiction should not be incorporated under the law’s 
doctrines of intoxication.  Instead, it should be acknowledged that addiction 
does affect mens rea and its effect should be considered in the mens rea 
analysis.  Finally, this Note encourages the update of the MPC and 
prescribes a section on addiction. 
A.  Addiction Is Distinct from Intoxication 
and Should Not Be Incorporated Under the Law’s 
Doctrines of Intoxication 
Application of the doctrine of voluntary intoxication to drug-addicted 
criminal defendants is inappropriate due to the significant differences 
between acute intoxication and long-term addiction.230  Even if criminal 
law’s doctrines of intoxication, limiting the relevance of intoxication to the 
mens rea analysis,231 remain unchanged, these doctrines should not be 
expanded so as to include such limitations on addiction.  Addiction is 
neither voluntary in the sense that we understand the term in reference to 
voluntary intoxication nor is it transient or as temporally connected to the 
act of drug ingestion as is intoxication.232  Therefore, the justifications for 
doctrines of intoxication that limit or eliminate the relevance of intoxication 
to the mens rea analysis do not apply to long-term drug addiction. 
Voluntariness justifies doctrines that limit intoxication’s relevance to the 
mens rea analysis.233  It is instinctively undesirable that a criminal 
defendant might not satisfy the elements of an offense simply because his 
voluntary intoxication rendered him unaware of the degree of risk involved 
in his actions.  Intoxicated actors can wreak havoc if they get behind the 
wheel of a car, play around with a dangerous object, or attempt physical 
contact with another person.  Criminal law seeks to deter the act of 
becoming so intoxicated that one cannot control himself or comprehend 
situational risks.234  The temporal relationship between imbibing 
intoxicating substances and the resultant intoxication, combined with the 
truly voluntary nature of such an act, may provide a reasonable justification 
for disallowing consideration of intoxication in the mens rea analysis, even 
if such intoxication does affect mental state.235 
The same reasoning cannot be extended to addiction.  The fear of 
addiction may deter some individuals from using drugs, but in the 
population of drug users, the emergence of addiction is too variable to 
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expect such a policy to significantly deter the state of addiction.236  The line 
between drug use and drug addiction is not well understood and is 
influenced by a variety of social, environmental, and biological factors.237  
While there may be a “safe” level of intoxication—thus, individuals may be 
deterred from becoming too intoxicated—there is no safe level of addiction.  
Furthermore, unlike the close temporal relationship between ingesting an 
intoxicant, being intoxicated, and committing acts while intoxicated, 
addiction is distinguished by its more tenuous connection between the 
initial acts contributing to one’s status as an addict, developing addiction, 
and offensive acts committed months or even years later.238  Therefore, the 
state of addiction cannot be deterred in the same way that Egelhoff suggests 
intoxication can be deterred. 
A counterpoint may be that including addiction within doctrines of 
intoxication is justified because it is sufficient to seek to deter all drug use 
in order to deter addiction.  However, plenty of addictive drugs are legal for 
adults to purchase and consume.239  Whether the addictive substance is 
alcohol, heroin, or methamphetamine, it is unrealistic for the success of a 
doctrine to rest on the deterrence of all drug use.  Therefore, deterrence 
does not justify including addiction within the doctrines of intoxication, as 
there is limited ability to deter addiction. 
Furthermore, the state of being an addict is not voluntary in the same 
sense as is the state of intoxication.  Neuroscience evidence suggests that 
the issues of voluntariness and choice are particularly nuanced for drug-
addicted individuals.240  Both the initiation and maintenance of addiction 
are influenced by a host of environmental and biological factors that are 
distinct from the direct effects of an intoxicating substance.241  Even when 
the effects of the drug are not pleasurable, addicts may continue to feel a 
compulsion to seek out the drug.242  Research on the dopaminergic system 
involved in addiction suggests that repeated use of drugs leads to reflexive 
behaviors, a relationship that is buoyed by the forming of complex 
associations between cues and the drug.243  The result is that previously 
neutral stimuli may themselves stimulate dopamine release and intense 
cravings for the drug.244  This cycle may be heightened by the various 
effects of the specific drug abused.245  Methamphetamine, for example, 
contributes to severe emotion dysregulation, inhibitory dysfunction, and 
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difficulty coping with stress.246  Each of these has been shown to increase 
drug craving, and it is worth noting that the neurotransmitter systems 
affected by methamphetamine are also disturbed by cocaine, heroin, and 
alcohol.247  Although initial drug use is a choice, neither the emergence nor 
maintenance of addiction is voluntary.  Therefore, the justification for 
criminal law’s doctrines of intoxication, which focuses on deterrence of the 
voluntary act of becoming intoxicated, does not provide a similar 
justification for applying those doctrines to addiction. 
B.  Addiction Does Affect Mental State 
and Should Be Considered in the Mens Rea Analysis 
As discussed above, addiction results in significant damage to neural 
structures and pathways that have a critical role in cognition and 
behavior.248  The culpability terms of the MPC and the mens rea terms used 
throughout American jurisdictions may require analysis of intent, 
awareness, and probability.249  Neuroscience research reveals that each of 
these is influenced by particular neural circuits and structures, many of 
which may be damaged by drug addiction as has been specifically 
demonstrated for methamphetamine addiction.250  It is at best naive to 
suggest that drug addiction has no effect on mental state or the formation of 
an offense’s requisite mens rea. 
The extent of the effect of addiction on mental state may vary according 
to many factors, including severity of addiction, type of drug, and 
comorbidities.251  Any such analysis, therefore, could not be a simple 
“check yes for addict” but would require the jury to carefully weigh the 
persuasiveness of all evidence regarding the nature of the individual 
defendant’s drug addiction and its potential effect on mental state.  
Although there are valid concerns about jurors’ ability to comprehend such 
complexities,252 that is precisely the role of the jury as fact-finder.253  
Concerns about juror aptitude are not unique to neuroscience evidence, and 
carefully constructed jury instructions may mitigate these issues.254  The 
pragmatic concerns of such an analysis should not prevent its 
implementation where it is necessary for a fair and just trial for all 
defendants. 
The mens rea analysis has traditionally been a subjective inquiry in 
American criminal law, designed to address the mental state of the 
defendant at the time of commission of the offensive act.255  A doctrine that 
would define the mental element of offenses to make addiction irrelevant, 
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as is allowed for intoxication under the Egelhoff doctrine,256 improperly 
elevates the importance of actus reus over mens rea.  This amounts to strict 
liability for the act, with no consideration of the mental state of the actor.257  
Such a doctrine is anathema to traditional offense definitions in American 
criminal law.  What is traditionally a subjective analysis for all defendants 
is redefined to become an objective analysis for drug-addicted defendants 
only.258  Moreover, this departs from fundamental principles of American 
criminal law and potentially violates due process. 
This Note does not suggest the elimination of criminal responsibility for 
drug-addicted criminal defendants.  Instead, it seeks to remind legal 
institutions that mens rea remains a critical justification for criminal 
liability, one that should not be manipulated for specific categories of 
defendants.  Nor should modern science be ignored for the sake of 
simplicity.259  It may be that future scientific findings continue to 
complicate the assignment of criminal culpability.260  However, the practice 
of limiting the relevance of addiction to mental state renders the mens rea 
analysis an unacceptable legal fiction now.  Therefore, the potential effects 
of addiction on mental state should be considered in the mens rea analysis.  
Doctrines that would eliminate addiction’s relevance may violate the 
constitutional rights of criminal defendants. 
C.  The MPC Should Be Updated to Reflect Current Science 
and Acknowledge the Effect of Addiction on Mental State 
The drafters of the MPC relied on the science of their time when 
developing the mens rea culpability categories and doctrine of intoxication, 
which focuses almost exclusively on alcohol.261  While an immense 
achievement in American criminal law at the time, both of these sections 
are now outdated.  “In promulgating a Model Penal Code, the American 
Law Institute sought and obtained the trust and reliance of many states who 
adopted their model code.  Knowing the model to be seriously flawed, the 
Institute has an obligation to address those flaws.”262 
Immense advances in science in the time since its completion have led to 
calls for an update in the MPC’s approach to mental state.  Professor Denno 
writes, “The failure to update the MPC further has resulted in a mens rea 
provision that no longer mirrors current science if it is interpreted in the 
way it was originally intended.”263  Although section 2.02’s reliance on 
Freudian psychotherapy renders the MPC’s focus on “voluntary act” and 
“conscious object” outdated, and the assignation of greater liability for 
knowingly than recklessly is potentially at odds with the values of the 
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everyday citizen,264 the MPC’s culpability terms are at least a workable 
attempt to categorize mental states.  What is no longer workable, however, 
is the MPC’s ignorance of addiction.  The ALI has updated portions of the 
MPC from time to time.265  It is time for the ALI to reexamine the MPC’s 
intoxication section and, crucially, include an additional section on 
addiction that reflects modern neuroscience.  This Note proposes adoption 
of the following: 
§ 2.X. Addiction. 
(1) Addiction is not a defense unless it negatives an element of the 
offense. 
(2) Addiction does not, in itself, negative an element of the offense but 
requires additional proof that the effect of the addiction is such that it 
negatives an offense’s requisite mens rea.  The burden of proof for 
such a showing lies with the defendant. 
(3) A criminal defendant’s addiction to intoxicating substances is 
relevant to the analysis of the mental culpability or mens rea elements 
of an offense.  Factors that may be considered in analyzing the 
potential effect of addiction on mens rea include but are not limited to: 
(a) Severity of addiction.  Indicia of severity may include length of 
addiction, frequency of drug use, and history of overdose or 
hospitalization. 
(b) Drug(s) of choice.  Expert testimony and scientific research 
regarding the neural, cognitive, and behavioral effects of the 
specific drug(s) abused are encouraged. 
(c) Neurological damage observed in defendant.  Brain scans and 
expert testimony are not dispositive but may assist the fact-finder. 
(d) Comorbidities.  These may include a history of depression, 
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, psychosis, or any other relevant 
disease or disorder. 
(e) Any other factor(s) deemed relevant and significant by the 
scientific and legal communities. 
(4) In considering these factors, the goal is to elucidate the subjective 
mental state of the defendant during the commission of the offense for 
which he has been charged. 
The ALI’s adoption of such a provision on addiction will hopefully be a 
call to action for the state and federal systems.  In the process, the ALI 
might consider whether its culpability terms and intoxication sections also 
require an update to reflect modern values and scientific understanding.  At 
the very least, it is imperative that the ALI acknowledge the vast amount of 
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research on the effects of addiction on cognition and behavior.  As the self-
proclaimed “leading independent organization in the United States 
producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and improve the law,”266 
the ALI has a professional and moral obligation to address a fundamental 
flaw existing within one of their most important contributions, the Model 
Penal Code. 
CONCLUSION 
American criminal law is outdated in its approach to the effect of drugs 
on the mens rea analysis.  Modern neuroscience findings reveal extensive 
differences between acute intoxication and drug addiction, particularly with 
regard to voluntariness and effects on neurophysiology, cognition, and 
behavior.  However, the Modern Penal Code, U.S. Supreme Court, common 
law, and legislatures all fail to recognize these distinctions in their criminal 
law doctrines.  It is time for legal acknowledgment and adoption of 
neuroscience findings, particularly with regard to the relevance of addiction 
to the mens rea analysis.  Addiction should be distinguished from 
intoxication and a new doctrine of addiction should be adopted.  Any 
doctrine of addiction must recognize the relevance of drug addiction to the 
mens rea analysis and incorporate a subjective analysis of the potential 
influence of addiction on the mental state of the criminal defendant in 
question.  Anything less renders delusory the mens rea analysis for drug-
addicted criminal defendants and may result in fundamental injustice. 
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